(2007) Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2).
No heterophenomenology without autophenomenology
variations on a theme of mine
Eduard Marbach
pp. 75-87
The paper assumes that the very source for an appropriate concept formation and categorization of the phenomena of consciousness is provided by pre-reflectively living through one's own experiences (of perceiving, remembering, imagining, picturing, judging, etc.) and reflecting upon them. It tries to argue that without reflective auto-phenomenological theorizing about such phenomena, there is no prospect for a scientific study of consciousness doing fully justice to the phenomena themselves. To substantiate the point, a detailed reflective and descriptive analysis of re-presentational experiences is presented, an essential property of which is their containing in themselves components that can only be individuated on the basis of reflection by the experiencing subject him- or herself. For heterophenomenology to account for them, autophenomenology is therefore presupposed.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11097-006-9027-x
Full citation:
Marbach, E. (2007). No heterophenomenology without autophenomenology: variations on a theme of mine. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2), pp. 75-87.
This document is unfortunately not available for download at the moment.