METODO

International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Book | Chapter

187853

(1974) Kant's theory of knowledge, Dordrecht, Springer.

Kant and Anglo-saxon criticism

John Niemeyer Findlay

pp. 187-207

My aim in this lecture is to show how certain Anglo-Saxon thinkers, in virtue of their very critical attitude towards certain central doctrines and assumptions of Kant, have in fact purged Kant's thought of much that is merely peripheral and overlaying, and have so released Hermes in the block, the philosopher in the picture-thinker and model-maker, to a much greater extent than would otherwise have been possible. I am not, of course, so ignorant and so arrogant as not to know that German thought has throughout its history only gone back to Kant in order to go beyond him, and that it has long been an axiom of Kant-study that no one who truly understands Kant can do other than this. Anyone who enters profoundly into the living web of contradiction in which the Kantian writings consist must necessarily follow the illumination shed by some of its glinting facets and ignore that which beams from others. Few can hold in suspense, and in inconsistent unity, the many distinct approaches and interests that nestle together in the thought of Kant: everyone inevitably opts for some in preference to others.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-2294-1_19

Full citation:

Findlay, J.N. (1974)., Kant and Anglo-saxon criticism, in L. White Beck (ed.), Kant's theory of knowledge, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 187-207.

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