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Apophantics, as theory of senses, and truth-logic
The result of these observations — which have concerned the manners of judging [Urteilsweisen] that belong to, and the intentionality that holds sway in, the sciences — will help us to progress in our structural understanding of the idea of logic. We recall that, from its inception, logic intended to be theory of science. Accordingly it always looked to the antecedent beginnings, or the extensively executed projects, of the sciences as its field of examples; and it understood reason and rational production according to that moment in scientific projects which, though not at hand as an actualization of the ideal, nevertheless evinced in itself the ideal final sense of scientific intentionality. This makes it comprehensible that, for logic, the judgment-sphere purely as such had to be set apart and first of all become a thematic field by itself. /Logic, as theory of science, therefore constituted itself, from the very beginning, as a science that intended to serve that criticism which creates genuine science. The cognitions, the sciences, which it looked upon as examples, it took as mere claims — that is: as mere "judgments" (suppositions) and judgment-systems, which must be submitted to criticism and which then, as determined with the aid of criticism, must be fashioned in such a manner that the predicate "truth" can be rightly ascribed to them.
Husserl, E. (1969). Apophantics, as theory of senses, and truth-logic, in Formal and transcendental logic, Den Haag, Nijhoff, pp. 130-148.
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