METODO

International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Book | Chapter

148327

(2002) The ontology of time, Dordrecht, Springer.

Searching for the lost subject

Alexei Chernyakov

pp. 157-185

We have already seen that in Aristotle's description of the mechanism of the "soul" the metaphor of place, expressed or implied, plays a major role. The soul is a kind of a map of abilities or powers (δυνáμεlς), and these powers in action form the system of energeiai having various internal forms. The unity of the soul so described is a topological, structural unity. Strictly speaking the soul itself is the principle of unity, since it is "the form (εlδoς) of a natural body, which potentially has life" (De anima II 1, 412a20f. ). The soul is the internal form or the essence (oυσlα) of a living body as such it comprises and unites all manifestations or ener;eiai of life (for the soul itself is the first entelechy of a living body (412a27), including, if we mean man, the energeia of intelligence (υόησlς) and the energeia of circumspection (φρόυησlς), i. e., the energeia of good deeds.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-3407-3_7

Full citation:

Chernyakov, A. (2002). Searching for the lost subject, in The ontology of time, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 157-185.

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