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I would like to discuss a particular version of realism about logic which, some philosophers have recently claimed, characterizes the Tractatus and contrasts it with the later thoughts of Wittgenstein. My aim is not to argue whether there are two Wittgensteins, the earlier realist and the later, or whether there is one continuous Wittgenstein with common philosophical interests and with some fixed and some gradually evolving views. Although it will become clear that I maintain the latter view, it seems to me that there has been enough Wittgensteinian exegesis done before, and during, this centennial year and there is therefore no need for me to add to it.¹ What I want to discuss is rather, whether the versions of realism about logic described by these commentators is coherent or clear at all, and, therefore whether it is clear what it is that one is ascribing to early Wittgenstein. I will suggest a different reading of his view about logic and the world.

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-30086-2_2

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