METODO

International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Book | Chapter

195579

(2010) Beyond mimesis and convention, Dordrecht, Springer.

Telling instances

Catherine Z. Elgin

pp. 1-17

Science, we are told, is (or at least aspires to be) a mirror of nature, while art imitates life. If so, both disciplines produce, or hope to produce, representations that reflect the way the mind-independent world is. Scientific representations are supposed to be complete, accurate, precise and distortion-free. Although artistic representations are granted more leeway, they too are supposed to resemble their subjects. Underlying these clichés is the widespread conviction that representations are intentional surrogates for, or replicas of, their objects. If so, a representation should resemble its referent.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-90-481-3851-7_1

Full citation:

Elgin, C. Z. (2010)., Telling instances, in R. Frigg & M. C. Hunter (eds.), Beyond mimesis and convention, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 1-17.

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