Book | Chapter
![201075](https://sdvigpress.org/images/publi/_default.jpg)
(1999) Cartesian meditations, Dordrecht, Springer.
Phenomenological constitution has been for us, up to now, constitution of any intentional object whatever. It has embraced the full breadth of the topic, cogito — cogitatum. We shall now proceed to differentiate this breadth structurally, and to prepare for a more pregnant concept of constitution. It has not mattered up to now, whether the objects in question were truly existent or non-existent, or whether they were possible or impossible. These differences are not perchance excluded from the field of inquiry by abstaining from decision about the being or non-being of the world (and, consequently, of other already-given objectivities). On the contrary, under the broadly understood titles, reason and unreason, as correlative titles for being and non-being, they are an all-embracing theme for phenomenology. By epoché we effect a reduction to our pure meaning (cogito) and to the meant, purely as meant. The predicates being and non-being, and their modal variants, relate to the latter — accordingly, not to objects simpliciter but to the objective sense. / The predicates truth (correctness) and falsity, albeit in a most extremely broad sense, relate to the former, to the particular meaning or intending.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-9997-8_4
Full citation:
Husserl, E. (1999). Constitutional problems: truth and actuality, in Cartesian meditations, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 56-64.
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