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While, from the very first, the theory of relativity emerged in quite a complete form as regards its physical aspects, its philosophical foundations were uncovered only gradually. To be sure, Einstein's work characteristically rests upon a totally lucid insight into basic philosophical concepts, but the creator of this great theory possessed this insight more as intuitive knowledge than in the form of a conceptually complete epistemology. Above all, his attention is directed so intently upon the physical development of the theory that dwelling at length upon the philosophical foundations would only obstruct his progress. His all-too-brief philosophical comments have caused some opponents to accuse him of a lack of philosophical understanding and to attempt to restrict his achievements to a merely mathematical significance— a misunderstanding that can only appear laughable to anyone well acquainted with Einstein's physical theory, particularly with his mode of thinking. Is it possible to regard as a philosophical layman a physicist who so successfully returns to epistemological problems in resolving physical difficulties? Surely it would be more fitting to endeavour to establish through modest philosophical work what Einstein has actually achieved by way of philosophical knowledge, while leaving to him the right to continue expanding his new physics untroubled by its philosophical consequences. It has frequently occurred during the course of the history of philosophy that the natural sciences have produced many more philosophical ideas than the philosophy of the scholars. We thank the exact sciences for the conquest of scholasticism, — such men as Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo, without whom others, such as Descartes and Leibniz — themselves half-mathematicians — would not have been able to lay the foundations of their epistemology. Will we perhaps witness in our own day another turning point, whereby mathematics and physics will again recognize the way of knowledge better than the judges appointed for that purpose?

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-9855-1_3

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