Book | Chapter
(2006) Intersubjective temporality, Dordrecht, Springer.
As we know, there is a constant aspect of the "no-longer" in present consciousness. In Husserl's earliest analyses, this was usually referred to as the "fresh memory," or "primary memory," of the "now-phase," terminology which corresponds to the period of Husserl's analyses prior to his turning to absolute consciousness as the foundation of inner time-consciousness. We will set aside the importance of absolute consciousness for now, and focus instead on the qualities Husserl assigns to the notion of primary memory at this early point, especially those which remain consistent as his description of the structure of temporalizing consciousness matures.
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Full citation:
Rodemeyer, L. (2006). Husserl's development of retention, in Intersubjective temporality, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 77-104.
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