Book | Chapter
(1981) Inquiries and provocations, Dordrecht, Springer.
The purpose of this paper is to make clear (1) that the widely recognized formulations of the principle of induction do not express the most fundamental rule of induction; (2) that the current view concerning the probability of induction must be revised in terms of a frequency theory of probability; (3) that on this basis the problem of induction in its traditional form is a pseudo-problem; and (4) that the principle of induction must be interpreted as a ">pragmatic or operational maxim.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-9426-9_9
Full citation:
Feigl, H. (1981). The logical character of the principle of induction, in Inquiries and provocations, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 153-163.
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