Book | Chapter
(1989) Cause, mind, and reality, Dordrecht, Springer.
Why perception is not singular reference
pp. 111-120
Charles Chastain has developed a general notion of singular reference based on the reference relation a singular term bears to its referent.1 He holds that perception is, in this broad sense, a kind of reference. Subtleties aside, he holds that one perceives something if and only if one has a sense experience that refers to it.2 This account of perception plays a central role in his framework for a theory of reference: Perceptual reference is, he holds, the primary way that referential chains are initiated.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-9734-2_8
Full citation:
(1989)., Why perception is not singular reference, in J. Heil (ed.), Cause, mind, and reality, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 111-120.
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