METODO

International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Book | Chapter

207456

(2013) New formalist criticism, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.

Method, meaning, new formalism

Fredric V. Bogel

pp. 17-58

we know about the world insofar as we experience it according to the unchanging and universally shared structure of mind. All rational beings think the world in terms of space, time, and categories such as cause and effect, substance, unity, plurality, necessity, possibility and reality. That is, whenever we think about anything, we have to think about it in certain ways (for example, as having causes, as existing or not existing, as being one thing or many things, as being real or imaginary, as being something that has to exist or doesn’t have to exist), not because that is the way the world is, but rather because that is the way that our minds order experience. We can be said to know things about the world, then, not because we somehow step outside of our minds to compare what we experience with some reality outside of it, but rather because the world we know is always already organized according to a certain fixed (innate) pattern that is the mind.1

Publication details

DOI: 10.1057/9781137362599_2

Full citation:

Bogel, F. V. (2013). Method, meaning, new formalism, in New formalist criticism, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 17-58.

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