(1994) Synthese 101 (2).
One of the most common views about self-deception ascribes contradictory beliefs to the self-deceiver. In this paper it is argued that this view (the contradiction strategy) is inconsistent with plausible common-sense principles of belief attribution. Other dubious assumptions made by contradiction strategists are also examined. It is concluded that the contradiction strategy is an inadequate account of self-deception. Two other well-known views — those of Robert Audi and Alfred Mele — are investigated and found wanting. A new theory of self-deception relying on an extension of Mark Johnston's subintentional mental tropisms is proposed and defended.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/BF01064020
Full citation:
Hales, S. D. (1994). Self-deception and belief attribution. Synthese 101 (2), pp. 273-289.
This document is unfortunately not available for download at the moment.