Journal | Contributors | Profile

(2020). Phenomenology: a contemporary introduction, Routledge, London-New York.

(2020). Review of S. DeLay, Before God. Phenomenological Reviews 6, pp. 35.

(2016)., Phenomenal conservatism and the principle of all principles, in D. Dahlstrom, A. Elpidorou & W. Hopp (eds.), Philosophy of mind and phenomenology, London-New York, Routledge, pp. n/a.

with Dahlstrom, D. , Elpidorou, A. (eds) (2016). Philosophy of mind and phenomenology: Conceptual and empirical approaches, Routledge, London-New York.

(2014). Is Seeing Intentional? A Response to Travis. Methodos 14, pp. n/a.

(2013). No such look: problems with the dual content theory. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4), pp. 813-833.

(2013). Précis of perception and knowledge: a phenomenological account. Husserl Studies 29 (1), pp. 29-32.

(2013). Replies. Husserl Studies 29 (1), pp. 65-77.

(2012). Review of B. Hopkins, The philosophy of Husserl. Husserl Studies 28 (3), pp. 239-249.

(2012)., The (many) foundations of knowledge, in D. Zahavi (ed.), The Oxford handbook of contemporary phenomenology, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 327-348.

(2010). How to think about nonconceptual content. The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy 10, pp. 1-24.

(2009). Phenomenology and fallibility. Husserl Studies 25 (1), pp. 1-14.

(2009). Reply to Heffernan. Husserl Studies 25 (1), pp. 45-49.

(2008). The philosophy of Edmund Husserl. Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 29 (2), pp. 175-184.