Journal | Contributors | Profile

References
Matthew McGrath
(2018). Defeating pragmatic encroachment?. Synthese 195 (7), pp. 3051-3064.
(2013). Dogmatism, underminers and skepticism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3), pp. 533-562.
with Fantl, J. (2012). Contextualism and subject-sensitivity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3), pp. 693-702.
with Fantl, J. (2012). Précis of knowledge in an uncertain world. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2), pp. 441-446.
with Fantl, J. (2012). Replies to Cohen, Neta and Reed. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2), pp. 473-490.
with Fantl, J. (2007). On pragmatic encroachment in epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3), pp. 558-589.
(2007). Memory and epistemic conservatism. Synthese 157 (1), pp. 1-24.
(2005). Truth without objectivity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2), pp. 491-494.
(2003). What the deflationist may say about truthmaking. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3), pp. 666-688.
(2002). Scott Soames: understanding truth. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2), pp. 410-417.
(2001). Platonism and anti-Platonism in mathematics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1), pp. 239-242.