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(1988). Plantinga, foundationalism, and the charge of self-referential incoherence. Grazer Philosophische Studien 31, pp. 187-193.

(1990). Internalism and epistemically responsible belief. Synthese 85 (2), pp. 245-277.

(1991). Sense and certainty, by Marie McGinn. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (3), pp. 689-693.

(1995). Reid's critique of Berkeley and Hume: what's the big idea?. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2), pp. 279-296.

(2000). Two kinds of intellectual virtue. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1), pp. 179-184.

(2003). Further thoughts on agent reliabilism: replies to Cohen, Geivett, Kvanvig, and Schmitt and Lahroodi. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2), pp. 466-480.

(2003). Précis of putting skeptics in their place: the nature of skeptical arguments and their role in philosophical inquiry. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2), pp. 432-436.

(2007). Worries about Pritchard's safety. Synthese 158 (3), pp. 299-302.

with Breyer, D. (2008). Cognitive integration and the ownership of belief: response to Bernecker. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1), pp. 173-184.

(2012). A (different) virtue epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1), pp. 1-26.