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After having clarified in section 1.1 and 1.2 three elements that we usually do not connect to a "rigorous" form of philosophy, especially as Husserl sometimes demanded it, we are now in the position to move on to concrete phenomenological analyses, which can be carried out on the grounds that have, at this point, been methodologically uncovered. This chapter has four sections, each of which deal with (1) the central role of affectivity, (2) the lived Body, and (3) intersubjectivity, and all of which, taken together, make up the central elements of a forceful concept of subjectivity. As Husserl scholarship has uncovered during the last two decades, the phenomenon of affection plays a central role in Husserl's thinking after 1913. The masterful translation by Anthony Steinbock of Husserl's lectures on "Passive Synthesis" have made one of the central texts of this period available to the English-speaking world. From these lectures and other manuscripts, including the later manuscripts on time, the reader could get the impression that Husserl moves away from the principle of intentionality and closer to a "speculative" analysis of those elements that are no longer understandable in an intentional framework, such as "hyle." The impact of French thinkers, such as Levinas and Henry, has indeed supported such a view on Husserl. And it is certainly correct to claim that our experience contains nonintentional moments, and in this chapter we will extensively deal with those elements. However, I am nonetheless convinced that these "passive" structures of consciousness and the constitution of our world presuppose — prior to every analysis of the microcosms of sensation -the world itself, which is ultimately constituted by the intentional correlation of cogito and cogitatum. Husserl never gave this principle up. Nevertheless, it seems to be correct to point out the central role of affectivity for everything connected to experience and the constitution of the world. Accordingly, as I will show in the following sections, affectivity should be further understood in relation to both (1) the subject itself in the form of "affecting oneself" and (2) other subjects as "affecting the other," the distinction of which Zahavi has termed self-affection vs. "hetero-affection" (Zahavi 1998a).

DOI: 10.1057/9780230589582_3

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