METODO

International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Book | Chapter

205525

(1989) Cause, mind, and reality, Dordrecht, Springer.

Intention

David Charles

pp. 33-52

According to commonsense psychology, mature humans have intentions, desires and beliefs. Very young children and some animals have desires and beliefs and act intentionally, but lack intentions. So what is distinctive of intending? What is added when we form intentions as well as possessing desires and beliefs?

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-9734-2_4

Full citation:

Charles, D. (1989)., Intention, in J. Heil (ed.), Cause, mind, and reality, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 33-52.

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