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The longstanding problem I said I would tackle at the close of the previous chapter stems from the apparent fact that we can say true things about things that don't exist. Among those who think there are truths to be told "about fictional objects", two views prevail. One is the so-called Meinongian view that, e.g.,"Pegasus has wings' is true for the same reason that sentences of subject-predicate form are usually true: because there is a horse, Pegasus, which is winged. That this horse does not exist is beside the point. The other view is that the sentence"Pegasus has wings' is really about a myth, and that whatever truth there is to be told is a truth about that myth. The second view allows us to avoid nonexistent objects, but is otherwise not particularly plausible; the sentence"Reagan has a ranch" makes no covert appeal to California legend, and it is rather unclear why"Pegasus has wings' should be any different. Both views, I think, are to be rejected. I wish to defend something like the second view in this chapter; it will I hope come as no surprise by now that my own explanation will be pragmatic rather than semantic.

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-2061-3_7

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