(2005) Synthese 146 (1-2).
The case for psychologism in default and inheritance reasoning
Francis Jeffry Pelletier, Renée Elio
pp. 7-35
Default reasoning occurs whenever the truth of the evidence available to the reasoner does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion being drawn. Despite this, one is entitled to draw the conclusion “by default” on the grounds that we have no information which would make us doubt that the inference should be drawn. It is the type of conclusion we draw in the ordinary world and ordinary situations in which we find ourselves.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-005-9063-z
Full citation:
Jeffry Pelletier, F. , Elio, R. (2005). The case for psychologism in default and inheritance reasoning. Synthese 146 (1-2), pp. 7-35.
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