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with Fennell, D. (2010). Does roush show that evidence should be probable?. Synthese 175 (3), pp. 289-310.

(1999). Causal diversity and the Markov condition. Synthese 121 (1-2), pp. 3-27.

(1995). Précis of nature's capacities and their measurement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1), pp. 153-156.

(1995). Reply to Eells, Humphreys and Morrison. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1), pp. 177-187.

(1993). In defence of "this worldly" causality: comments on van Fraassen's laws and symmetry. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53, pp. 423-429.

(1993). Is natural science "natural" enough?: a reply to Philip Allport. Synthese 94 (2), pp. 291-301.

(1991). Can wholism reconcile the inaccuracy of theory with the accuracy of prediction?. Synthese 89 (1), pp. 3-13.

(1989). The Born-Einstein debate: where application and explanation separate. Synthese 81 (3), pp. 271-282.